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Abstract
We investigate how the colonial strategy through the settlement decision aﬀected French
trade patterns. In this regard, we construct a new database relying on various primary historical
sources containing information on the value of French sectoral trade between 1880 and 1913.
We suggest two channels through which European settlements might have impacted the French
trade patterns: institutions and networking. Our results suggest that worse institutions in the
French colonies increased the levels of extraction through trade, whereas better institutions in
the British colonies promoted better trade relations with France. Even among the extractive
environment, the network increases overall French trade within French colonies but reduces it
in other colonies.
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1 Introduction
Economic exploitation is wildely held to have been the driver of colonization: European settlement in
the 1900's was a way to establish colonization while trade served as tool for exploitation. Although
political power rivalry might have been another driver of colonial expansions, economic motives
remain the ultimate goal of colonization. This economic facet of colonialism is important because it
has a longstanding inﬂuence on current economic disparities among the former colonies (Acemoglu,
2001; Alam, 1994; Bretocchi, 2001; Kown, 2011; Lange, 2006; Nunn, 2008-2009; Sylwester, 2007).
European powers established their colonial control by settling in the colonies and exploiting their
resources through trade. This assertion is not new to the literature and can be traced back to
Hobson, Lenin and on down to Marxist thinkers, who regarded trade as the prime cause of imperialist
expansion (Kleiman, 1976). The French colonization oﬀers a quite representative example: French
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colonizers settled, namely in the form of military troops, imposed territorial powers, and set up
trade policies and preferential trade agreements in order to transfer resources from the colony to
themselves and secure favorable markets for their products (Crowder, 1968)1
Colonial exploitation in its "legitimate form" occured under the veil of colonial trade, hence the
latter oﬀers an illustrative picture of how colonizers applied extractive policies in their colonies. For
that reason, looking at the trade relation between one colonial empire -taking the particular case of
French empire- with the diﬀerent groups of colonies during the age of high imperialism help us shed
the light on this angle of the colonial strategy.
To gain some perspective on this question, this paper investigates how the amount of European
settlement in 1900's in the colonies aﬀected France's level of resource extraction through trade values
and patterns, as well as whether those patterns of trade diﬀer if the trading partner were the French
colonies or other colonies. Figure 1a depicts the transmission mechanisms of colonialism on trade.
We hypothesize that if the French settled in their colonies for the purpose of exploiting their raw
materials and using their markets to sell their products, one would expect more french imports of
raw materials and exports of manufactured goods as a result of this settlement, as arrows 1 and 2 in
ﬁgure 1a illustrate. Meanwhile if the British or other Europeans settled in their respective colonies,
this would not necessarly increase French imports of other colonies' raw materials. In the case where
the British settlement had a positive impact on French bilateral trade with the British colonies, this
would mean that the latters were engaging in favorable trade2 with France as arrows 1 and 3 of
Figure 1a show.
While some studies explore this issue in a related way by looking at the eﬀect of colonial status
on bilateral trade3, they only rely on colonial dummies and total trade instead of sectoral bilateral
trade. They show that being colonized exerts a positive impact on total bilateral trade.
Colonial settlements clearly mattered for economic exploitation, but through which channels
did those settlements impact French trade patterns with the various groups of colonies? We argue
that European settlements had (1) a direct eﬀect on colonial relations related to the social network
developed through their presence and (2) an indirect one related to the type of institutions they have
introduced. To investigate this relationship, we empirically separate the network eﬀect of settlement
1A country's trade with territories politically dependent on it is more proﬁtable than its trade with the rest of the world.
In cases where trade monopolies were granted to empires, they need not, in theory at least, to have aﬀected the colony's
choice of trade partners. "But the growing internal democratization of the colonial powers [...] required a trade structure
biased towards the metropolitan country as a necessary condition for the economic exploitation of colonial territories through
trade [...]" (Kleiman, 1976, p.459).
2Favorable trade is deﬁned in this context as the one that allows countries to engage in exchange wherever it is mutually
proﬁtable to both parties, unlike the "forced trade" or the extractive trade that is a form of resoruces exploitation.
3Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008; Rose 2000, 2002; DeSousa & Lochard, 2012
2
from its institutional eﬀect. We ﬁrst estimate the impact of the share of European settlers in 1900
on the French sectoral imports and exports and then estimate separately the channels through which
this eﬀect might have operated as mentioned above: the networking (reﬂected under two indicators
which are common language with the colonizer and duration of colonization), and the institutions
(reﬂected under democracy and constraints of the executive).
Regarding the network eﬀect, in a recent study on the causal relationship between migration
and trade, Bacarreza et al., (2006) used 1990-2003 data from Bolivia, to show that the presence of
foregin immigrants in Bolivia and of Bolivian emigrants abroad have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects
on Bolivian bilateral trade. A similar argument can be applied to the colonial era: Glaeser et al.,
(2004) argued that European settlers brought more than just institutions to the New World: they
also brought their own selves. Settlers promoted their language and got acquainted with the system,
habits, and traits of the colonies which reduced transaction costs and made the exploitation of
resource traded easier, as arrows 1,2 and 4 in ﬁgure 1b depict.
Another channel explaining settlement is institutions. In their paper on the colonial origins of
comparative development, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, (2001) argued that where Europeans
migrated in large numbers, they introduced European-style institutions with property rights checks
and accountability for the governor and higher levels of democracy. Those institutions persisted
and impacted positively the economic performance of those countries who inherited the "good"
institutions. Recent studies, on their turn, show that a higher quality of institutions exerts signiﬁcant
positive eﬀects on current bilateral trade ﬂows due to the decreasing transaction cost and increasing
level of trust (Briant et al. 2009; DeSousa & Lochard, 2010; De Groot et al. 2004; Linders, 2004).
We hypothesize similarly that such institutions if introduced by the colonizer, could lead to favorable
trade between the the latter and the colonies. That is, if for instance, British settlements introduced
such institutions ("good institutions"), this would result in favorable total trade and trade patterns
between France and British colonies, as depicted in points 3, 5 and 7 of Figure 1b. On the other
hand, if French settlements introduced policies that perpetuated inequality and exploitation, it
should increase the level of imports of raw materials from French colonies and thus the level of
extractive trade as points 6 and 8 in the same ﬁgure show. This relationship is embodied in the
larger literature examining the longstanding impact of institutional legacy on current economic
performance (Acemoglu, 2001; Alam, 1994; Bretocchi, 2001; Kown, 2011; Lange, 2006; Nunn, 2008-
2009; Sylwester, 2007).
In this regard, we constructed a new data set with more than 20,000 observations containing
information on the value of French imports and exports with each of its trading partners between
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1880 and 1913. The data were collected from "Tableau General du commerce" which is the most
complete and reliable database, as it is the oﬃcial data of the French Customs. Our data are superior
to previous work in the sectoral and directional dimensions as it contains information on the exports
and imports of France with each of its trading partners, disaggregated into four sectors: agricultural
raw materials, food, raw material necessary for industry, and manufactured goods.
Prior to our work, a number of studies investigated the impact of colonial status on both historical
and current trade (Estevadeoral et al., 2003; Mitchener Weidenmier, 2008, DeSousa & Lochard, 2012)
while others have examined the eﬀect of independence on post-colonial trade (Mayer et al., 2010;
Lochard & Lavallée, 2012). No paper to our knowledge has focused on understanding how colonial
settlements through both channels of networking and institutions impacted diﬀerently the types of
products traded between France and various colonial groups. This gap is partly due to the fact that
their samples lacked such detailed data on colonial and sectoral French trade.
We ﬁnd that higher French settlement increased the overall French imports and exports from
French colonies. The impact is stronger with respect to imports of raw materials suggesting that
French settlements did facilitate the extraction of raw materials. The British or other European
settlements in their respective colonies lead to a decrease in the trade of those colonies with France.
Interestingly, our results not only show the impact of European settlements on trade patterns but
also point out that the mechanism through which membership in an empire exerted positive eﬀects
on bilateral trade as previously found by Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) is through European
Settlements. Actually, once we control for European settlements in the various groups of colonies,
colonial dummies exert either insigniﬁcant or negative eﬀects on French trade. Such results go
beyond those found in previous literature.
We then separately examine the impact of institutions and of networking through European
settlements.4 We ﬁnd that in French colonies, worse institutions promote French imports of raw
material and French exports of manufactured goods. These results conﬁrm our hypothesis stated
earlier that France was better at exploiting its colonies in the presence of extractive institutions. On
the other hand, higher institutional quality in the British colonies is associated with higher trade
between those colonies and France conﬁrming also that better institutions promote favorable trade
in the absence of power imbalance between the two trading partners.
As for the networking eﬀect, we ﬁnd that stronger networking between France and its colonies
increased French exports and imports in French colonies, with the highest magnitude attributed to
4As we will explain in the next sections in the paper, we empirically disentangle the settlement eﬀect between these two
channels.
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French imports of raw agricultural goods. In the French colonies, the positive impact of networking
is complementary to the negative impact of institutions in the sense that extractive policies can be
more easily implemented whenever the colonizer have acquired greater power through networking.
This in turn, would boost extraction through trade. We also found that the stronger network relation
developed between British settlers and their respective colonies, is the less trade will be conducted
those colonies and France. These results still hold after controlling for endogeneity problems and
for the diﬀerent choice of instruments.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the literature examining the
link between colonial settlement and the promotion of trade. Section 3 presents the gravity model,
the data used in the empirical setting, and the core results. Section 4 depicts the channels through
which settlement might have aﬀected trade. The last section provides a conclusion.
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Figure 1: Motivation scheme
2 Colonization, Settlement and Trade
A careful reading of the economics and history literature suggests a variety of reasons to explain
why colonization might have aﬀected the patterns of trade during the high imperialism period. As
the main goal of colonialism, trade was initiated by principles of mercantilism and of imperialism.
Betts (1961) and Kown (2011) relate the expansion of imperial control to mercantile economic
policies, which led to demands for formal political control. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) further
argue that, prior to the Industrial Revolution, colonial acquisitions were continuously sought by
imperial powers to complement their growing economies, which ultimately aﬀected colonial trade.
The authors ﬁnd that belonging to an empire doubled trade relative to those countries that were
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previously not part of an empire.5 These ﬁndings are consistent with previous literature suggesting
that colonial domination has increased colonies' trade with their metropolitan countries (Bairoch,
1981; Kleiman, 1976).
In its extreme form, colonization reﬂects some form of "enforced trade", which implies some
monopolization of colonial trade, "forcing the colony's population to buy their imports for more and
to sell their exports for less than going world prices" (Kleiman, 1976, p. 1). To a lesser extreme,
colonies are not entirely subjugated to the colonizer and have some level of internal sovereignty;
hence, exploitation in its literal sense becomes diﬃcult and "a trade structure biased towards the
metropolitan country is needed for the economic exploitation of colonial territories through trade"
(Kleiman, 1976, p. 1). Colonization facilitates trade by using power to impose preferential trade
policies, currency and custom unions (Crowder, 1968; Estevadeordal et al., 2003; Furgeson & Schu-
larick, 2006; Lal, 2004; Mitchener & Weidenmier, 2008). Using French colonization as an example,
the French beneﬁted from low-cost imports, especially agricultural goods, and from some trade
agreements that gave large advantages to French exports (Amin, 1971, 1973; Lavallee Lochard,
2012).
According to Head et al. (2010), former colonies' trade with the metropolis, three decades after
acquiring its independence, would shrink by more than 60% due to the termination of some forms
of formal or informal trade agreements. Hostile separations put an end to any form of inﬂuence or
domination, leading to immediate reductions in trade. Similar results were put forth by Lochard and
Lavallée (2012), who show that an independence event reduce the overall post-independence trade
mainly within the French colonies. These results suggest that colonial trade was upheld against the
interests of the inhabitants of the colonies and, consequently, the attainment of sovereignty would
be followed by a decrease in bilateral trade.
Such results are contradicting as independence leads to a decrease but not a total elimination of
trade, suggestion that part of the trade was beneﬁcial. Thus, colonization and the resulting trade
agreements only partially explain the extractive trade, because a colony's tendency to trade with
its empire might be driven by preferential treatment or other conditions favouring such trade, even
in the absence of colonial domination. One aspect distinguishing various types of dependencies is
whether colonies were free to decide what and with whom to trade outside their colonial empire.
This distinction can be made using our data: for example, if British colonies with better institutions
5Agricultural exports boomed in the Gold coast, including Senegal, Ivory Coast and other French colonies in West
Africa; in return, these colonies began to import Europeans manufactured goods. In Indochina (a French colony), the land
under cultivation dramatically increased, allowing it to become the third largest producer of rice in the world (Mitchener &
Weidenmier, 2008)
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traded with French empire, this indicates that regardless whether they were forced or not to trade
with their own empire, they were also allowed to engage in favourable trade with external partners
such as France.
As indicated in the introduction, the main goal behind this research is that Europeans settle-
ments in colonies in the 1900s, might have had a direct and indirect impact on the trade relations
between the two countries: On the one hand, settlements led to the establishment of connections that
deepened the colonizers' networks, enabling them to maintain more extractive policies and exploit
resources more easily. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) assert that countries endowed with favourable
climates and soil conditions for crops encouraged European settlement, but ultimately ended up
with unequal slave economies to fall in the hands of a small elite who implemented policies and
institutions that perpetuated inequality, thereby lowering incentives for investment and innovation.
On the other hand, settlements led to the creation of European style institutions that lowered
the level of enforced trade. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that, whenever Europeans found viable
areas, they tended to settle, build infrastructure, and promote European-style institutions that have
persisted until today; wherever they faced tropical soils and diseases, they confronted the high costs
of cultivation, building and trade, which demotivated the settlers, leaving them with only extractive
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Nunn & Puga, 2010).
European settlements, whether extractive or institutional, increased French trade. In order to
empirically investigate how the latter aﬀected the French extractive versus favorable trade patterns
with the various colonial groups and to assess the importance of European settlements on trade as
compared to other factors that might also aﬀect trade, we will estimate an augmented gravity model
in the next section.
3 Baseline Model and Estimated Equations
For our empirical analysis, we use an augmented gravity model to include the share of European
settlers in the 1900s among every 100 inhabitants in the host country (denoted by European set-
tlement) as a main explanatory variable, together with mass, distance and a number of economic
and geographical variables (i.e., currency and custom unions, tariﬀs, wars, landlocked and colonial
dummies). The climate variables are particularly relevant to our sectoral sample as they aﬀect
agricultural productivity. The colonial status dummies are also relevant as they help shed light on
whether settlements within colonization mattered for trade or whether only the colonial status per
se aﬀected trade. We also include an interaction term between European settlement and colonial
dummies in order to check whether the impact of French settlements diﬀers from settlements from
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other colonizers in their own colonies.6
The gravity model is the workhorse model for examining trade ﬂows and is used extensively in
the literature due in part to its good ﬁt to the data. In its basic form, the model suggests that
the bigger the mass, that is, the larger the economy, the greater the trade is, whereas the larger
the distance (a force of resistance), the lesser the trade. We will estimate several regressions of the
following standard gravity equation:
Ln(Trade)its = β0 +
∑
j∈J
βjDijESi + βXit + , (1)
where i denotes the country France is trading with, and t the year in which trade occurred, s
denotes the sector of trade; we included four sectors: food, agricultural raw materials, raw materials
for industry and manufactured goods. j is one colonial group within J the set of colonizers such
as J = (France, GreatBritain, other empires, former empires). Dij are colonial Dummies for
British, other and former colonies. ESi is an abreviation of European Settlements in 1900 in country
i. The interaction between Dij and ESi and the subsequent four diﬀerent βj allow us to diﬀerentiate
how European settlements in French colonies aﬀect French trade with those colonies compared to
how European settlements in British, other and former colonies aﬀect those colonies' trade with
France. The last term is the stochastic error term, which captures all other (omitted) eﬀects on
trade and is assumed to be well-behaved.
X is a vector of explanatory variables composed of:
Xit = (ln(population density in 1900)i, ln(distance)i, landlocki, Interstatewarit, F renchwart,
trade preferenceijt, customunionijt, currency unionijt, temperaturei, Humidityi, Dijt), for j ∈ J
The control variables are population density in 1900 capturing the size of a country, the distance
between France and its trading partner, dummies capturing whether the trading country was land-
locked, dummies capturing whether country i was in a state of war and another dummy showing
whether France was at war during the sample year. Following earlier studies, we also incorporated
historicalinstitutional dummies: Nine distinct dummies show whether country i was part of a for-
mal or informal trade preference, currency union and custom union with one colonial group j ∈ J ,
where J = (France, GreatBritain, other empires, former empires). These variables are relevant
to control for, because such trade agreements are supposed to increase French colonies' trade with
6We assume that European settlement in British colonies was mainly carried out by the British as French people had not
interest in settling in British colonies during the colonial era. The results in the following tables conﬁrm our assumption.
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France while reducing it for other colonies. We also included climate indicators (temperature, hu-
midity) and ﬁnally colonial dummies Dijtshowing whether country i was either a French, British,
other or former colony at time t.
We estimate equation (1) using pooled ordinary least squares, with year ﬁxed eﬀects to control
for any random annual shock. Country ﬁxed eﬀects were not included since we already controlled
for many relevant country speciﬁc eﬀects in the equation. In regressions not reported in this paper,
country ﬁxed eﬀects show insigniﬁcant results for most of the countries.
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We have constructed a large database of annual French sectoral trade from French statistical primary
sources. In particular, we relied on numerous volumes of the "Tableau Général du commerce de la
France" and the "Tableau décennal du commerce de la France". The data include more than 20,000
observations of French bilateral imports and exports from 1880 to 1913 for a total of 98 colonies,
including 27 French colonies, 37 British colonies, 17 other colonies and 17 previous colonies.7 The
data are disaggregated into the following sectors: agricultural raw materials; raw materials for
industry; and manufactured products. The French exports reported as agricultural goods consist
mainly of food products produced in France (ﬂour, wine, oil) and not agricultural raw material,
while its imports of agricultural products, are basically raw materials (i.e., wheat, sugar, fruits).
We note that France biggest share of exports to its colonies consisted of food sector which accounts
for more than 80% of French colonial exports. The raw materials for industry consist of mining
products such as gold, cobalt, phosphate, iron, wood, and wool. The manufactured goods consist of
all things produced by either France or the colonies.
The trade data were originally collected at the aggregate level by colonial groups and geographi-
cal regions and were subject to continuous changes throughout the years of the sample. Taking into
account, on a yearly basis, the political and historical events (i.e. colonization, independence, cre-
ation of a nation, new groups entering the sample), we were able to assign the appropriate countries
to each colonial group, using population density collected from Mitchell (2007) and Madison (2005)
7French colonies: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Fasso, Cambodia, Central african Republic, Chad, Congo, French Guiana,
French Polynesia, Gabon, Guadeloupe, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Martinique, Mauritania, New Caledo-
nia, Vanuatu, Niger, Reunion, St Pierre and Miquelon, Senegal, Vietnam, Morocco, and Tunisia. British colonies: Antigua
and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana,
Gibraltar, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saint
Lucia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Egypt, and India. Other colonies: Angola, Aruba, Cameroon, Cuba, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Indonesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines, Puerto Ricco, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Togo, Virgin Islands
(US), and Western Sahara. Previous colonies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela
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as a weight to assign trade values for each country.8 The disaggregation of the countries from the
group level to the individual level, as described above, is presented in table A.2 in the appendix.9
We deﬂated the data using the INSEE published index of prices calculated from the gross prices
of 45 products (base 100 Francs 1914). We collected trade data as early as 1880 because colonial
quests and trade expansion witnessed a signiﬁcant increase starting the early 1880s. However, even
though our data extend from 1880, for this empirical regression we start in 1890 in order to maintain
the time frame between trade and settlements. Our European settlement variable is time invariant
representing the year 1900. From various historical backgrounds, we believe that Europeans started
to settle extensively in the colonies in the early 1890's which is the period of colonial expansion.
The settlements that occured in 1890's did not vary signiﬁcantly within the 10 subsequent years.
Hence, our available data on European settlement in 1900 is thought to capture most accurately the
settlement from 1890 until 1913 which is the period capturing also our trade data.10
European settlement in the 1900s is the percentage of the population that was European or of
European descent in the year 1900 in the countries included in our sample. We argue that European
settlements is mainly due to the colonial settlements and hence relate each European colonizer to
its colony. The data on European settlements is from Acemoglu et al. (2001), and the missing
values for some French colonies were completed using data from Huillery (2011). Huillery's data
were collected at the district level for the countries of West Africa; thus, we aggregated the data to
the national level and transformed the share from per mil into percentages to match the initial data
from Acemoglu et al. (2001), as shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
We would have liked to include GDP to measure mass in our gravity model; however, reliable
annual estimates for the period of study are not available. We therefore use population per square
kilometer from Nunn (2011). In the pre-industrial, Malthusian era, population density can be used
as an appropriate measure for a society's economic performance since, at the time, any technolog-
ical improvement led to population increases rather than per capita income increases (Engerman
& Sokoloﬀ, 1997). Michael Kremer (1993), Galor (2005) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) provided
theoretical and empirical analyses of the relationship among population size, population density and
long-term growth in Malthusian times (Madison, 2006; Mitchell, 2007). Missing data were adjusted
and interpolated from available data based on population dynamics.
8We conducted an alternative weight measure using arable land area and added the results as robustness checks
9The groups are well deﬁned in terms of geographical location and identity of the colonizer so we were able to accurately
conduct the segregation process with minor losses of information. For details on the data construction, refer to our previous
paper not yet published available from the authors.
10 Extrapolating the Euorpean settlement in 1900 20 years backwards (i.e. back to 1880) is a stronger assumption and
harder to justify; for any doubt, robustness was conducted for the full sample size ,and the results were similar.
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The distance between France and its bilateral trade partners is from CEPII, constructed by
Mayer and Zignago (2011). The basic idea is to calculate the distance between two countries based
on bilateral distances between the biggest cities of those two countries, with the distances being
weighted by the share of the city in the country's overall population. Landlocked data were collected
from the Geo CEPII data (Mayer & Zignago, 2011) and from Nunn (2008).
Following previous studies (Mitchener & Weidenmeir, 2008; Rose, 2004), who found a signiﬁcant
impact of trade preferences (preferential trade agreements, custom unions, currency unions) on trade,
we included various dummies for trade preference, custom and currency unions to indicate whether
the country was in any form of agreement with France, Britain or a third colonial power. These
variables are from Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008).11 The data on whether country i was at war or
France was at war in a particular year were constructed based on the data from the Correlates of War
website. The climate variables, average temperature and average humidity, are from Acemoglu et al.
(2001), using those from Parker (1997) for the missing countries. We took the average temperature
in Centigrade and the average humidity in percentages.
The colonial status dummies were constructed based on the Geo CEPII data constructed by
Mayer and Zignago (2011). For the dates of colonization, we collected information from various
sources. We deﬁned the year of colonization as the year the colonizer established the colony, not
the year it acquired the land. In addition, we considered only the year of independence from the
colonizer, not from other conﬂicts. As the sample spans a long period, political states often changed,
as did countries' placement and colonial status within the sample. If many colonizers established
colonies in the same area, we considered only the most recent one (if established before 1880);
otherwise, the country's colonial status alternated among the various colonial dummies.
Our database signiﬁcantly improves upon previous trade data as it includes bilateral exports
and imports and it is disaggregated into four sectors: agricultural goods, food, raw materials for
industry and manufactured goods. As a result, it is better suited for sorting out the relative impact of
European settlements on extractive versus mutually favorable trade. The data are annual and cover
all French trading partners. We included data on 98 colonies, which includes most existing colonies
during the focal time period; all have identiﬁed colonial status. This detailed and comprehensive
data permits a comparative analysis of French trade with respectively French colonies, other colonies
(including German, Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese) as well as former colonies. This distinction
is important when attempting to estimate how diﬀerent colonial settlements whether the British,
the Portuguese... etc, aﬀected their respective colonies' trade patterns with an the external trading
11We thank Marc Weidenmier and Chris Mitchener for generously sharing their data
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partner (e.g., a British colony trading with France) as well as how the French settlement shaped the
trade relations with their own colonies.
Figure 2 shows the world map containing all the countries included in our sample and how they
were divided among the colonial powers. Table 1 below shows the relative shares of French trade
values with each group of colonies. Notice that French exports of raw materials for industry and
their imports of manufactured goods were very small compared to trade in other sectors (not more
than 1% of total trade). We then choose not to include exports of raw materials for industry and
imports of manufactured goods in our regression, since they are not economically signiﬁcant as the
values of trade given that these two sectors are very low, as reported in Table 1.
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Figure 2: The trading partners of France per colonial groups
3.2 Empirical Results
3.2.1 POLS results
Table 2 reports the pooled ordinary least-squares (POLS) regressions of equation (1). The esti-
mated coeﬃcient for European settlements in 1900 is signiﬁcant for most sectors and interaction
terms. Column 1 presents the results for the impact of the explanatory variables on the total trade
with France. As indicated by the coeﬃcients of the interaction term between European Settlement
with the colony dummies, we ﬁnd that a higher share of settlers in French colonies increased trade
with France, but a higher share of settlers in other colonies decreased trade with France. This
result suggests that settlers in other colonies were mainly their colonizers; once they settled, they
constrained the colonial trade with France. An interesting result is that, after interacting European
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settlement variable with the colonial Dummies Dijt, the French colonial dummy DiFr did not seem
to have a positive impact on trade with France. This result goes beyond the one found by Mitchener
and Weidenmier (2008), whose result is limited to stating that membership in an empire increased
bilateral trade. Our results go one step futher by showing the mechanisms through which this mem-
bership impacted trade. Interestingly, once we control for this mechanism -the colonial settlements
in the colonies-, colonial dummy has an insigniﬁcant or in some instances negative impact on trade
with France. Those results suggest that that colonial status per se does not necessarily aﬀect trade
rather the colonial settlements and other subsequent indicators resulting from colonization.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show the impact of European settlement on French exports of food
and of manufactured goods, respectively. A higher share of French settlers increase French exports of
food and of manufactured products. This result supports our hypothesis: colonization, as previously
argued, provided a way for the French to establish control through settlements and strengthen their
trade ties in order to use the colonial market as the main consumer of its products. Marseilles (1984)
observed that France, isolated within its empire and imposing the prices of products in the colonial
markets through custom unions and trade preferences, exported its manufactured products to ensure
the existence of solvable markets for the empire during times of crisis. With respect to the British
and other colonies, more British and other European settlements has a negative impact on French
exports of food and manufactured products.
One limitation in our POLS results is reversed causality. The possibility that the ﬂag might have
followed trade could produce biased results in the OLS panel regressions. One potential explanation
is that the French might have been exploiting the natural resources even before formal colonization
took place; hence, they did not need to, nor were they encouraged to settle in order to extract. Why
is this the case? Actually, the colonial vocation was generally not popular in France. The health
conditions were deplorable; tropical diseases took a heavy toll in the colonial corps between 1887
and 1912 (16% died in the colonies) (Victor Marguerite, De La Justice, Annals Colonials XIII June
1, 1912). Consequently, administrators could not bring their families with them, and few men were
willing to accept a lifetime career away from their families.12 This being stated, as long as they
were able to engage in trade, settlements overseas were limited to some traders and oﬃcers. (Cohen,
1971) This eﬀect should decrease the OLS coeﬃcient, and controlling for it should lead to a higher
Instrumental variable coeﬃcient. This is true as we will see in the next subsection when comparing
12Cohen relates in his book Rulers of Empire that overseas French possessions were modest and scarcely populated; they
consisted of plantation owners, slaves and small trade forts on the coastline of West Africa and India which were occupied
by a small number of French traders and oﬃcers. Relation with the indigenous population were limited to trade and the
establishment of some form of diplomatic relations with the local states (Cohen, 1971)
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the POLS coeﬃcient to the IV coeﬃcients that the latters are higher. This eﬀect is however more
important for the imports of raw agricutlural goods. This explain why in column 4 of table 2,
European settlements in French colonies have a negative impact on France imports of agricultural
goods due to the reverse causality issue not yet corrected for.
In the same column we see that British settlements increase French imports of raw agricultural
products from British colonies. This positive eﬀect of British settlements on French imports from
British colonies can be attributed to two possible explanations. On the one hand, reverse causality
might have increased the POLS estimator. The idea is that it is not the British settlements that drove
british colonies to trade with France. It may have been the case that France was already importing
agricultural raw products from British colonies even before colonization, and Great Britain non-
randomly sought those territories expecting economic proﬁts. On the other hand, after Britain
established colonization, it set up certain trade policies with its colonies to encourage trade with
other empires.13 This second explanation can be conﬁrmed by the positive estimator of trade
agreements with British colonies, indicating that British colonies that signed trade agreements with
Britain increased their exports of raw materials to France by 130%.14
The standard gravity variables were controlled for, although not reported in the table. Most
variables enter with the correct expected sign and are, for most sectors and for overall trade, sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. In terms of geographical inﬂuences on trade, all else being constant, being
landlocked or far away from the trading partner reduces trade ﬂows. Most speciﬁcations also show
that larger countries (as measured here by population) trade more. Furthermore, the interstate and
French war variables signiﬁcantly reduce trade. No speciﬁc-year ﬁxed eﬀects were noted.
Although we tried to control for most factors aﬀecting trade, as described earlier, OLS results
cannot be interpreted as either causative or accurate for a number of reasons. In particular colo-
nization may be endogenous to trade. The fact that trade might have preceeded colonial expansions
or even lead to it, is a plausible possibility. In order to correct for this endogeneity problem we will
employ a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation method which will be described in detail in the
next sub section.
13Britain established open door policies: An open door trade policy refers to a tariﬀ regime where there is no distinction
made between the products of the mother country and non-empire trading partners.
14Desousa and Lochard's (2012) "Trade and Colonial Status" provides further discussion of reverse causality between
colonization and trade.
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3.2.2 Identiﬁcation of Instrumental Variables
A major drawback of OLS results on the impact of colonization or colonial settlements on trade is
that of reverse causality: Pre-colonial trade should have exerted strong impacts on settlement and
colonization decisions.
We propose three possible instruments for European settlements in 1900 for our identiﬁcation
strategy. The ﬁrst one is pre-colonial population density (in the 1500s). Engerman & Sokoloﬀ (1997)
argue that Europeans were more likely to settle in previously poor and less populated regions because
indigenous population density raises costs for Europeans to obtain and secure land for new settlers.
Acemoglu et al. (2002) also argue that Europeans settlements in 1900's are negatively correlated with
pre-colonial population because the density of pre-colonial indigenous population aﬀects the returns
from setting up extractive institutions. Following the same line of arguments, Huillery's (2011)
recent empirical results show that pre-colonial high population density would increase the risk of
indigenous hostility and hence discourage new settlements. Based on this discussion, population
density in 1500 might have had a signiﬁcant impact on decisions related to European settlement in
1900. We have no reason to believe that population density in 1500 is correlated to trade in 1900.
The second instrument for European Settlements is latitude: Latitude measures the distance
from equator. Europeans would be more likely to settle in a region with latitude is closer to Europe.
Our starting point is the impact of favourable land and climate on the decision to settle. Favourable
conditions undoubtedly encouraged settlers to settle whereas unfavourable climate would have dis-
couraged settlement, leading to the creation of extractive policies and mercantile colonial rules.
However, latitude is also correlated to climate, and geographical conditions which favour agricul-
tural. Latitude would then have a direct impact on trade making this identiﬁcation invalid in terms
of sectoral trade.
The third instrument is Settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) who argue that
historical mortality rates were inﬂuential in shaping the pattern of European settlement in former
colonies. However, the main constraint in settler mortality data, aside from doubts about its various
sources (Albouy, 2005), is the fact that it can be correlated with two main ecological handicaps:
low agricultural productivity and a high burden of diseases. Thus, this instrument correlates with
agricultural trade and then not valid.
All in all, population density in 1500 seems to be the most appropriate instrument since unlike the
other two, it should have no direct relation with trade in 1900 unless through European settlements.
Our identiﬁcation can be expressed as follows:
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European Settlement = α0 + α1popden1500 +αXit + ϑ (2)
where X is the vector of our explanatory variables as described previously in equation 1.
The results reported in Table 3, show that the coeﬃcient of our preferred instrument, the popu-
lation density, has the highest magnitude with an R-square of 58%. The coeﬃcients of latitude and
settler mortality taken alone, have high magnitudes and strong explanatory power with R-square
respectively 50% and 70%, when taken with population density, this magnitude decreases dramati-
cally conﬁrming the superiority of population density in 1500 as an instrument. Note, nevertheless
that these other two instruments will be used for robustness purposes.
3.2.3 2SLS Results
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the ﬁrst stage results of our instrumental variable regression using
population density in 1500 as an instrument for European Settlement, whereas Table 4 reports the
second stage results of the same regression. Columns 1 to 3 report the instrumental variable results
for respectively total trade, exports of food and exports of manufactured products. Those results
are very similar to the baseline regressions for most of the sectors and most of the variables in
the regressions and are robust and signiﬁcant: Higher settlements in French colonies increase both
total trade and French exports of food and manufactured goods to those colonies whereas, higher
settlements in British and other colonies decrease total trade with France and French exports to
those colonies.
It is interesting to note that the coeﬃcients for imports of raw agricultural material are opposite
to the ones in the POLS as shown in column 4 of Table 4. The 2SLS results indicate that an
increase of a 1% point in French settlements increased the French imports of agricultural goods
from French colonies by nearly 8%, whereas an increase of a 1% point in the share of British
settlements decreased French imports of agricultural goods by nearly 6%. Once we controlled for
reverse causality, our results indicate that French settlements would facilitate extraction, causing
imports of raw agricultural material from their colonies to increase. This result is in line with what
Marseilles (1984, p. 75) wrote: "The colonial empire was reserve tank of agricultural commodities"
(translation by the author).
Column 5 shows positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of British settlements on French imports of in-
dustrial raw materials from the British colonies. A possible explanation for this result would be
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that British colonies might had a comparative advantage in raw material for industry, which they
were able to exploit due to the "open door" policy of Great Britain (refer to footnote13). In other
words, British colonies under open door trade policy did not have a preferential tariﬀ with their
metropole, so that they trade with other partners such as France. Even though results indicated
that British settlements negatively aﬀected overall French trade with the British colonies, this eﬀect
varies depending on the sector in question. We hope to shed further light on this result once we
disentangle its eﬀects between network and institutions in section 4.
To provide some additional insights to the eﬀects of European settlements on sectoral French
trade, it is interesting to look at the export boom in French West Africanamely, in Senegal and
the Ivory Coastbetween 1897 and 1913. Timber exports from the Ivory Coast increased by a
factor of six in twenty years (Frieden, 2006), as colonial imports of European manufacturers grew.
In Indochina (which was under French colonial regime), the area of cultivated land dramatically
increased, allowing it to become the third largest producer of rice in the world (Mitchener & Wei-
denmier, 2008). French settlements strengthened their ties between the empire and its colonial
markets, achieving the ultimate goal of French colonization, as stated by Jules Ferry in his 1911
essay La politique coloniale était ﬁlle de la politique industrielle. France used the colonial markets
as both a buﬀer in times of crisis and a proﬁtable alternative in times of expansion to dispense its
products (Marseilles, 1984).
3.3 Robustness Checks
To check whether our results are sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the econometric model, we conducted
a series of robustness checks. The ﬁrst column in Table 5 is the same as column 1 in Table 2 used
for here as a reference for comparison. The ﬁrst test we conduct is by including the full sample of
trade from 1880 to 1913 instead of 1890-1913. The inclusion of 10 additional years (i.e., 18801890)
does not change our results. As shown in column (2) of Table 5 French settlements still had a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on overall trade. The results are similar to the base sample POLS in
column 1 for the remainder of the control variables (not reported here). Column 3 present results
of the same regression, but dissagregating trade data from the original region to the country level
using arable land area instead of population. The data were assembled using a variety of sources,
including Mitchell (2007), Madisson (2006) and Nunn (2009). Although the individual values of
trade associated to each country diﬀer under this speciﬁcation, the estimated coeﬃcients of our
main explanatory variables and the remaining control variables are similar results to the ones in the
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base regression in column 1.
Columns (4) to (7) in Table 5 use alternative instrumental variables, as previously discussed.
We ﬁrst check whether the use of settler mortality and latitude as instrumental variables, compared
to our initial instrumental variable, changed our results; we then included all three instrumental
variables together. Our results seem to be robust to all speciﬁcations: French settlements did
increase overall French trade in the French colonies whereas other European settlements reduced
it. The other variables in the gravity model generally have the predicted signs and are statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels.15
4 The Settlement Eﬀect
Our empirical results suggest that European settlements in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected trade within the French colonies and negatively aﬀected
trade for some sectors of British and other colonies. These results convey that settlements can
contain diﬀerent underlying channels through which they aﬀected trade. They can operate through
networking or, indirectly, through institutions. In this section, we explore these channels through
which settlements might have aﬀected the patterns of trade ﬂows. On the one hand, we argue
settlers who were attracted by the land and low labour income in the colonies used their presence and
connexions as a means to uphold extractive policies and facilitate full control over the resources, as we
hypothesize will be the case of French imports from French colonies. On the other hand, European
settlers might have also brought their European-style institutions and invested in infrastructure
which promoted innovation and industrialization, as is the case of the British colonies (i.e., neo-
Europe). We hypothesize that those institutions brought by the British settlers to their colonies
would promote their trade with France. In the next subsection, we discuss the two channels in turn:
networking and institutions.
4.1 Networking
A ﬁrst channel through which European settlement might have boosted French colonial trade is
networking. Recent studies have highlighted the importance of networks in monitoring trade in
unorganized exchange markets as they facilitate matching the seller/buyer and fostering deals where
laws of contract are weak (Rauch, 1999). Some evidence in the trade literature suggests that weak
15To ensure robustness, we also conducted the same analysis for each sector separately, (not reported here). Most variables
and interaction terms showed similar results as previously reported (not reported here).
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contracting institutions can be substituted by long-term relationships as well as kin- and ethnic-
based networks to ensure eﬃcient engagements (Nunn & Treﬂer, 2013). Moreover, Sandberg et
al. (2012) argue that former trade networks have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on current trade volumes
attributed to regionalism (via the enactment of regional trade agreements) and history (via the
modern eﬀects of former imperial relationships). Similarly and even more importantly in the colonies,
where communication was harder, societies were less developed and legal apparutus was absent,
social networking had a greater role in creating some sort of informal contract enforcement that,
even under extractive policies, would enhance trade between two countries.
Networking is also linked to European settlement. Easterly and Levine (2012) as well as Glaesser,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) argue that, when they settled, Europeans not only
brought institutions, but they also brought themselves. Lasting physical settlements helped settlers
enforce higher production controls over the labour, leading to potentially higher productivity; Set-
tlers also promoted common language, thereby making communication with merchants easier. "Even
in cases where the dominant language of the population diﬀered from that of the imperial power,
a lingua franca often developed around commercial centres" (Mitchener & Weidenmeir, 2008, p.
1821). Alam et al. (1994) also argues that colonizers had previously encourged emigration into their
dependencies to give a form of permanence to their occupation of these territories and strengthen
their ties.
Networking established by immigration reduces costs associated with international transaction.
Similar analogy can be attributed to the colonial period where immigration is deemed to represent
the colonial settlements and the networks are enhanced by the duration of colonization. Following
this logic, we argue that, the longer the colonization, the more likely the immigrants created an
inclusive social network with the indigenous population, thereby helping to alleviate uncertainty,
asymmetric information and opportunism associated with international trade. Parsons (2005) show
a positive relationship between immigration and bilateral trade ﬂows. Egger et al. (2012) also
argue that migrants acquire economic, cultural and institutional knowledge about both the home
and the host markets; they are able to mediate economic exchanges between those markets, thereby
increasing trade above what it would be in the absence of such migration. Colonizers needed to
actually settle in order to optimize the extraction of ﬁnancial and natural resources by reducing
information asymmetries that were even more severe during the age of high imperialism. Merchants
also, had a ﬁnancial incentive to learn the culture, habits and mostly the language of colonial masters
in order to sell more goods and protect themselves.In such situations, the mutual beneﬁt extracted
from trade is less likely.
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A simple example makes the point about the role of networks in exchanges. During the period
of colonial reign, colonizers were attracted by the cheap and abundant factor endowment in the
colonies. In order to extract the full rent from this "wealth", colonizers had to impose some form
of subjugation only possible through establishing strong networks within the colony on the ﬁeld.
Actually, societies with soil, crops and coﬀee faced the strong presence of settlers implementing
slavery and other policies that perpetuate inequality.
In order to describe the network eﬀect, we used two proxies that we believe are likely to best
represent the impact of networking as argued thus far. The ﬁrst variable is the duration of colo-
nization measured as the time spent by colonizers in the colony from the year of colonization until
the year in our sample. We argue that the longer the Europeans stayed, the more familiar they
became with local customs and culture, the development of distribution and marketing channels, or
the formation of social networks of the colony, thereby making it easier to exploit through trade.
In turn, this should decrease transaction costs associated with trade and hence increase extraction.
The second variable is common language with France, which is mainly a categorical variable showing
French-speaking countries along an index from 0 to 1, constructed based on the CEPII data set.
The data reported the ﬁrst four languages spoken by at least 20% of the population and the ﬁrst
two languages spoken by 9% to 20% of the population. The data contained information on whether
two countries share a common ethnological language, including the creoles of the French language
and a lingua franca. Based on these data and the historical background, we constructed our index
for language, ranging from 0 to 1 and taking the values of 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. On this
scale, 0.75 and 1 indicate that most of the population are French speaking or speak a French creole
(if the French creole was considered a lingua franca or language of trade).
4.2 Institutions
The second channel linking European settlement and trade is institutions. Nunn and Treﬂer (2013)
ﬁnd that institutions seem to exert a signiﬁcantly and economically important impact on the com-
parative advantage of advanced manufacturing goods, even after controlling for factor endowments.
This eﬀect occurs namely through factor accumulation, technological innovation and commercial
enterprise. In other studies of the impact of institutions on historical and current trade ﬂows,
Mitchener and Weidenmeir (2008) and Estevadeordal et al. (2002) show that the main channels
through which colonization has boosted trade occur through historicalinstitutional trade policies.
DeGroot (2004) ﬁnd that institutional homogeneity increases overall current trade ﬂows by 13%
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and that institutional quality increases it by 40% through securing and enforcing property rights in
international transactions.
Yet what shapes institutional legacy during the colonial reign? Diﬀerent types of colonization
policies create diﬀerent sets of institutionsan interpretation consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2001)
and Crosby (1986), who argue that the colonization strategy was subjective to the viability of set-
tlements. When European settlers faced favourable climate and soil conditions (resulting in low
mortality rates and advantageous disease environment), they felt encouraged to stay and introduced
good (productivity-enhancing) institutions which promote private property and checks against gov-
ernment power. This led to the creation of what Alfred Crosby called "Neo-Europe". Meanwhile,
when a settlement was not viable due to unfavourable bio-geographic conditions (resulting in high
mortality rates), they established extractive institutions. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) assert that,
when Europeans faced national resources with proﬁtable international markets but did not ﬁnd the
lands, climate, and disease environment suitable for large-scale settlement, they had no or little
incentive to invest in institutions or infrastructure in the colonies and instead created authoritarian
political institutions to extract and exploit natural resources.
Let us consider a few examples. The Belgian colonizers in the Democratic Republic of Congo
did not introduce any rule of law against government expropriation; extractivists only transferred
many of the colony's resources to their homeland. Between 1905 and 1914, 50% of French Dahomey
GDP was extracted by the French (Manning, 1982), and taxation rates in Tunisia were four times
as high as those in metropolitan France (Young, 1994). Another example is the case of the Spanish
and the Portuguese colonists during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who set up complex
mercantile systems of monopolies and trade regulations in order to obtain gold and other valuables.
Finally, British common-law colonies had better property rights and more developed ﬁnancial mar-
kets compared to French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies because of the sound economic and
political institutions and culture they inherited from Britain (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Landes,
1998; North et al., 1998).
In order to capture institutions, we used two main variables widely used in the economic history
literature. Our ﬁrst variable is constraint on executive for the year 1900, which is a seven-point
scale ranging from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more constraints. A score of 1 indicates
unlimited authority for the governor, 3 indicates slight to moderate limitations by other institutional
corps, 5 indicates substantial limitations, and 7 indicates executive parity or subordination. Scores
of 2, 4, and 6 indicate intermediate values. A higher score refers to a better quality of institutions.
Data are also from Acemoglu et al. (2001), and the missing values were completed from the polity
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III data set. In the French case, the constraint on administrators was very low, leading governors
to be brutal towards the indigenous population. Cohen (1971, p. 62) stated that French colonial
administration was, in actual practice, a decentralized system giving nearly full authority to the
men in the colonies: "The administrators tended to ignore their superiors and ruled their circles
according to their whims, they would levy severe ﬁnes on the natives without serious causes and
without the governors' permission."
Our second variable is democracy in 1900, which we measured using a category scale ranging from
0 to 10. A higher score indicated more democracy points from three dimensions: competitiveness
of political participation (from 1 to 3 points); competitiveness of executive recruitment (from 1 to
2 points, with a bonus of 1 point if there is an election); and constraints on chief executive (from
1 to 4 points). The measurement was equal to 1 if the country was not independent on the date
in question. In his recent work, Nunn (2013) showed that a tradition of local democracy is also
associated with attitudes that favour democracy, better quality institutions, and a higher level of
economic development. His ﬁndings not only indicated persistence in democratic institutions over
time, but are also consistent with national institutions aﬀected by local institutions.
4.3 Eﬀects of Networking and Institutions on Trade Volumes and Pat-
terns
Before assessing the eﬀects of these channels on French trade patterns, we ﬁrst disentangle the
European settlements eﬀect into two parts: one part associated with the networking eﬀect and the
second part associated with the institutions eﬀect, as represented in equation 3.
ESOLS/IV = α0 + α1I1 + α2I2 + β1N1 + β2N2 + µ (3)
where ES is the short of European Settlements in 1900, I1 refers to constraint on executive in
1900 and I2 to democracy in 1900. N1 and N2 refer respectively to common language and duration
of colonization. µ refers to the unexplained impact of settlement.
Table 6a reports the ordinary least squared regressions of equation 3. Column (1) of Table 6a
shows the regression of European settlement on the institutional indicators, constraint on executive
and democracy variables, whereas column (2) shows the same regression on the networking indica-
tors, the common language with France and the duration of colonization. The correlation coeﬃcient
are shown in Table 6b. Results of column (1) indicate that both institutional indicators are strongly
and positively correlated with European settlement with a signiﬁcant R-squared of 33%. Column
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(2) alternatively presents results for the networking indicators, common French language and years
spent in the empire. The colony takes a value between 0 and 1 if French language is among its
speaking languages. According to the results, common french language is negatively correlated with
European settlements and duration in in the colony is positively correlated with European settle-
ment. The negative result of column (2) is due to the fact that expect the French (where settlement is
scarce already) no other colonies speak French. Column (3) indicates the results of both networking
and insitutions impact on European settlements. We ﬁnd that networks and institutions are highly
correlated with European settlement and seem to capture a signiﬁcant amount of the variation in
settlements across colonies.
Columns (4) and (5) present some interesting results on how our networking and institutional
variables are correlated with our reduced samples including respectively French and British settle-
ments. We note that the more French settled, the lower the democracy in French colonies, whereas
higher British settlements are correlated with higher democracy in the British colonies. British
settlements are negatively correlated with common French language, where French settlements pro-
moted their language. As for the last variable, the longer the British colonized, the higher their
numbers in the colonies; however, the longer the French colonized, the lower their numbers. This
result is consistent with French settlements not being for long-term purposes; but rather mainly
limited to traders and military troops whose main role was to trade (Cohen, 1971).
We then compute the ﬁtted values of the part of European settlements associated to network-
ing and of the part associated with institutions in order to capture separately the part of Euro-
pean settlement related to each channel as reported in equation (4). In order to derive the es-
timators αˆ1, αˆ2, βˆ1, and βˆ2 of equation (4), we estimated equation (3) twice: once using the non
instrumented base observations of European settlements, then using the instrumented values of
European settlements by our initial instrument the population density in 1500. The ﬁtted val-
ues ̂ESlI(OLS), ̂ESI(IV ), ̂ESN(OLS), and ̂ESN(IV ) were then derived from the ﬁtted coeﬃcients of
networking and institutions.

̂ESIOLS = αˆ1I1 + αˆ2I2
̂ESNOLS = βˆ1N1 + βˆ2N2 and

̂ESIIV = αˆ1I1 + αˆ2I2
̂ESNIV = βˆ1N1 + βˆ2N2 (4)
We now consider the extent to which these variables mattered in shaping the type of goods
traded between France and the colonial groups. We replaced the European settlement variable used
in earlier empirical models, with the ﬁtted values of institutional impact and networking impact
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derived from the estimators of equation 3 and shown in equation 4 and interact those terms with
the colonial dummy as we did previously in equation (1). We also add the unexplained impact of
settlement µ derived from equation (3) in order to account for all possible unexplained channels
other than our two and that may impact the European settlement. The new gravity equation looks
like:
LTradeist = λ0 +
∑
j∈J
λ1jDij ̂ESIiOLS/IV +∑
j∈J
λ2jDij ̂ESNiOLS/IV +∑
j∈J
λ3jDijµ+ λXit + ε (5)
where λXit is a vector of explanatory variables detailed previously.
Notice that equation 5 was regressed twice, once for the POLS regression using ̂ESIiOLS , and̂ESNiOLS as will be reported in table 7 and second for the IV regression using ̂ESIiIV , and ̂ESNiIV
which results will be reported in table 8.
Table 7 reports the pooled OLS results of equation (5), while Table 8 reports the instrumental
variable results. Similar to the previous regressions all standard gravity variables (not reported here)
behave well in terms of sign and signiﬁcance. France traded less with countries that are more distant,
trade decreased with war, and humid and cold climate reduced trade. Trade preference with France
boosted trade with its colonies; however, countries that had trade agreements with their respective
empire tended to trade less with France. Colonial status exerted a negative impact on trade once
we controlled for settlement and other institutional factors.
The results of both pooled OLS regressions in Table 7 and the IV regressions in Table 8 are similar
for the overall trade and for the diﬀerent sectors, and both show that both channels signiﬁcantly
account for the eﬀects on the total and, patterns of French trade across colonies. For this reason
we will simply settle for discussing the instrumental variables results only.16 First the coeﬃcients
of Institutional impact of settlements in column (1) of Table 8 suggest that the worse institutions
in French settlements led to a decrease of overall trade with France within the french colonies. The
same is for other European settlements: better institutions in other colonies tended to reduce trade
with France. For British settlements and settlements in former colonies however, better institutions
were associated with higher overalltrade with France. Those former colonies were already sovereign
during the time where trade occured and had the freedom to engage in mutually proﬁtable trade.
Results of columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 also conﬁrm our initial hypothesis. An institutional
16Some of the instrumental variable results are higher in magnitude than the POLS results. Discussion was already made
in section 3.
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system lacking democracy and giving full authority to the governor would allow France to secure
favorable markets for its products within its colonies, exporting her products of food and of manu-
factured goods.
Results in columns (4) and (5) of Table 8 suggest a few insights. More authoritarian institutions
(less constraints and less democracy) in French colonies promoted exploitation of raw agricultural
goods and raw material for industry. Actually, those results conﬁrm why the French had a low
incentive to establish institutions. Their settlements were mainly limited to traders and military
troops, whose main role was to impose control in order to facilitate extractive policies. What they
developed was a system of institutions that permitted them to exercise unchallenged control over
their new acquisitions. Louis Faidherbe 17 wrote: In Algeria and Senegal the aim is the same,
to dominate the country at as low cost as possible and through this get the highest advantages
commerce. The function of the French oﬃcials was to maintain tranquility so that the natives could
work and produce and so that they could recognize the advantages of our domination. The governors
were entrusted with the safety and tranquility of the circles and instructed to make sure that the
inhabitants of their territory demonstrated the ﬁdelity and obedience that they owed France (Cohen,
1971). Our results also explain why post-independence trade between France and now its former
colonies sharply shrank after independence (Head et al., 2010). This decrease can be attributed to
the notion of "forced trade" developed through the system of authoritarian institutions that neither
promoted the welfare of the colony nor exploited its comparative advantage.
Regarding the British colonies, the results depicted in columns (2) to (5) of Table 8 also conﬁrm
our hypothesis: "good institutions" introduced by the British settlements boosted favorable trade
between British colonies and France, boosting both French exports to British colonies and British
colonies' exports of agricultural and industrial raw material to France. Many scholars have argued
that British common law countries appear to have less corruption, better contract enforcement, and
better protection of property rights. This overall higher institutional quality can reduce trade costs
(Anderson & Marcoullier, 2002; Levchenko, 2007; Rauch, 1999). Moreover, the British favoured
free trade policies, whereas the French generally enforced protectionist measures with their colonies.
This could also translate into diﬀerences in trade costs. Overall, the British induced representative
institutions in their colonies that promoted what the settlers wanted; what they wanted was freedom
and the ability to get rich by engaging in trade (Denoon, 1983). 18 Their British administration
17French general and colonial administrator who created the Senegalese Tirailleurs when he was governor of Senegal.
18The particular case of Australia and New Zealand is an intriguing example: settlers were namely ex-convicts who fought
for the establishment of European-like institutions in order to protect their rights against the arbitrary power of landowners,
who themselves, were the ex-jailors. They demanded jury trials, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and electoral representation
(Acemoglu et al., 2001).
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was known to be decentralized (unlike the French centralzed administration) and generally based
on conditions of the region's economic, social and ethnic development. Their sole purpose was
to practically ﬁnd ways to achieve colonial prosperity. Moreover, the British were credited with
allowing the native to have a hand in government and to have a "hand-oﬀ" policy. (Betts, 1961).
Chailley-Bert greatly admired the ﬂexibility of the British colonial system, whose colonies were not
rigidly categorized, were more timorous than the French ones, and were not insisting that their legal
codes are applicable anywhere." (chailley-Bert, 1894)
With respect to the network eﬀect of settlements, Table 8 also suggests that French colonies
beneﬁted most from French settlements through social networks (common language and number of
years spent in the colony). The results in column 1 indicate that even among extractive policies,
networking would boost overall trade. In particular, networking would increase extraction of agri-
cultural raw material (column 4) and french exports of manufactured goods (column 3). Greater
control induced by networking allowed the French to extract their colonies' raw materials and sell
their manufactured products and food to those colonies. Marseilles (1984, p. 121) noted: "L'empire
colonial, champs privilégié de l'exportation des capitaux français [...] un élément compensateur et
un débouché stable, [...] un débouché essentiel de matières premières."
The network impact, as expected, was only eﬀective on French trade within French colonies. A
greater number of years spent in their colonies tended to promote British and German trade, but was
less likely to promote French trade with those colonies. In addition, not transacting in a common
language with France would make exchange less easy increasing by this the transaction costs between
France and British and other colonies. Our results support the aforementioned assertion that the
networking impact of British and other settlements reduced overall trade with France.
It might be impossible to test empirically all of the ways in which European settlements aﬀected
trade patterns. However, we note that the residual impact of settlements in French colonies µ (and
British and other colonies which is not reported here) is very low in magnitude for the overall trade
and have no impact on some sectors. The channels we identiﬁed account for a signiﬁcant amount
of the dual impact of European settlement on French trade and help shed additional light on the
settlement eﬀect reported in this article.
5 Conclusion
How did the French, British, and other European settlements drive the French colonial trade
patterns? Did the French use their political control and networks to transfer resources from the
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colony to themselves as well as secure favourable markets for their products? Did the British or
other settlers introduce institutions in their colonies that favour mutually beneﬁcial trade, enabling
them to trade with France outside the circle of the empire? Which of France's products mainly
attracted the extractive policies? Did British colonies export their comparative advantage? We
provided some perspective on these questions by constructing a new database of more than 20,000
observations, relying on various primary historical sources containing information on the value of
French sectoral imports and exports with each of its trading partners from 1880 to 1913. We found
strong evidence that French exports and imports were quantitatively higher to colonies with more
French settlements, with the highest magnitude for French exports of manufactured goods and
imports of raw materials, emphasizing that the French sought territories to both extract resources
and procure markets for their products. British and other settlements, on average, led to a reduction
of French overall trade with their respective colonies. However, this eﬀect is ambiguous for sectoral
trade. The settlement eﬀect appears to be robust to a variety of econometric speciﬁcations, including
instrumental variable regressions and alternative instruments and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
We suggest two channels through which European settlements might have aﬀected French trade
patterns: institutions and networking. Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that the low constraints on
the French governors and the low democracy rates in the French colonies drove the colonizers to
perpetuate extractive policies, increasing the levels of extraction through trade. This study also
demonstrates that British colonies developed better institutions than other European colonies and
promoted better trade relations with France. Moreover, the diﬀerent eﬀects of social networks on
diﬀerent colonies help explain why the eﬀects of European settlers on trade diﬀer. French language
and customs were especially prevalent within the French colonies, thereby reducing the transaction
costs of trade and creating an extractive environment accounting for more than 100% of trade boosts.
These special social network eﬀects were no longer applicable when British or other Europeans
settled; hence, we see that networking eﬀect lessened French trade outside French colonies.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to empirically analyze how the initial en-
dowments of colonies aﬀected their institutional quality and economic performance. This is seen in
the literature in terms of the course of natural resources, which documents a negative relationship
between specialization in natural resource production and institutional development (Ross, 1999).
An earlier contributor to the literature, Barro (1999), showed that oil extraction hinders democracy.
This historical evidence suggests that the institutional development depends on whether the elite or
the merchants beneﬁted from this trade (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
Understanding the relationship between colonization and trade as well as its long-term legacies
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is a complicated process as colonial strategy was hard to capture. As Mitchener and Weidenmeir
(year) clearly stated, some colonies' exports were produced in very controlled plantation systems
whereby colonists owned and controlled the land and capital that coﬀee, sugar, rubber or other crops
were grown on and employed low-wage, local labor in the production of these commodities. Other
tradable sectors of the same colony might have been left untouched. To assess the long-term impact
of colonial trade, one should look at the institutional variation within and across colonies.
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Table 1: French trade with colonies
Exports Imports Total
Colonies
Manufactured
Goods Food
Raw material
for industry
Manufactured
Goods
Agricultural
raw material
Raw material
for industry
French 11% 10% 1% 1% 69% 8% 14,993,317.56
British 23% 8% 2% 0% 25% 42% 109,222.81
Other 76% 4% 1% 1% 8% 9% 494,316.28
Former 21% 9% 1% 1% 19% 48% 594,974.33
Total 14% 9% 1% 1% 65% 10% 16,191,830.97
Table 2: POLS: The Eﬀect of Settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured
Raw
Agricultural Raw Industrial
ES in French
colonies 0.09* 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.04** 0.01
(0.048) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
ES in British
Colonies 0.01 -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.01
(0.053) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010)
ES in other
Colonies -0.17*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.03 -0.01
(0.052) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009)
ES in Former
Colonies 0.05 -0.00 -0.02*** 0.04** 0.03***
(0.052) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010)
French colonies -8.48*** -0.46** -1.64*** -4.49*** -0.45*
(1.387) (0.214) (0.241) (0.369) (0.251)
British colonies -1.12*** -1.75*** -2.62*** -3.54*** -1.27***
(0.330) (0.215) (0.251) (0.346) (0.240)
Other Colonies -2.56*** -3.38*** -4.42*** -5.13*** -2.49***
(0.477) (0.297) (0.339) (0.481) (0.285)
Trade
preference w/
Britain -0.12 -0.52*** -0.99*** 1.30*** 0.06
(0.944) (0.150) (0.174) (0.214) (0.145)
Gravity
Standard YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 81.14*** 14.70*** 17.28*** 16.49*** 8.16***
(5.366) (0.868) (0.941) (1.511) (1.014)
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,981 2,130 2,124 2,086 2,124
R-squared 0.627 0.595 0.598 0.450 0.571
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: ES refer to European Settlement in 1900. Our standard gravity variables were not reported here. The results
show that they are signiﬁcant and report the correct sign. The larger the economy, the higher is the trade in all
sectors and the further away is the country from France, the lower will its trade with France. Being landlocked and
in times of war would reduce trade. Being part of a trade agreement, custom union or currency union with France
would increase trade, but being part of trade agreement with British or other empire would reduce it. Favorable
climate would also increase trade.
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Table 3: Instrumental Variables
European Settlement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Latitude 0.46*** 0.68*** 0.40***
(0.044) (0.040) (0.052)
LSettler Mortality -3.48*** -0.73*
(0.441) (0.406)
lpopden1500 -6.70*** -6.87*** -6.31***
(0.322) (0.281) (0.331)
Constant -16.43* -28.61*** 94.16*** -12.44
(8.862) (9.175) (8.275) (8.596) (12.902)
Observations 2,134 1,474 2,046 1,474 2,046
R-squared 0.501 0.702 0.585 0.827 0.604
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: The Eﬀect of Settlement on Trade: Instrumental Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Raw
agricultural
Raw industrial
ES in French
colonies
0.12* 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.08*** -0.01
(0.066) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
ES in British
Colonies
-0.17*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.06*** 0.03**
(0.064) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011)
ES in other
Colonies
-0.73*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.01
(0.082) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.013)
ES in Former
Colonies
-0.10 -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.04***
(0.067) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
French colonies -16.56*** -1.75*** -3.19*** -6.55*** -1.32***
(1.649) (0.248) (0.300) (0.402) (0.305)
Gravity
Standard
YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 96.84*** 18.35*** 21.95*** 18.62*** 7.94***
(6.195) (1.003) (1.249) (1.400) (1.122)
Observations 1,899 2,063 2,056 2,014 2,058
R-squared 0.655 0.620 0.616 0.503 0.558
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The instrument used for the above regressions is population density in 1500. ES refer to European Settlement
in 1900. Our standard gravity variables were not reported here.
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Table 5: Robustness Checks of Eﬀect of Settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS POLS full
sample
POLS Land
area
IV latitude IV Settler
mortality
IV Population
density 1500
IV all
instrumnets
ES in French
Colonies
0.09* 0.07* 0.006* 0.90*** 1.17*** 0.12* 0.42***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.003) (0.068) (0.131) (0.066) (0.052)
ES in British
Colonies
0.01 0.05 -0.006 0.16** 0.03 -0.17*** -0.21***
(0.053) (0.049) (0.27) (0.069) (0.076) (0.064) (0.054)
ES in Other
colonies
-0.17*** -0.15*** -0.04*** -0.13 0.30* -0.73*** 0.56***
(0.052) (0.048) (0.006) (0.097) (0.164) (0.082) (0.183)
ES in Fomer
Colonies
0.05 0.06 0.03*** 0.12** 0.08 -0.10 -0.10*
(0.052) (0.047) (0.004) (0.060) (0.081) (0.067) (0.056)
Constant 72.66*** 82.21*** 12.83*** 58.62*** 108.31*** 80.28*** 94.58***
(5.065) (4.790) (0.391) (4.480) (6.919) (5.709) (6.952)
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,981 2,815 2544 1,986 1,362 1,899 1,362
R-squared 0.627 0.60 0.425 0.667 0.71 0.655 0.694
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: ES refer to European Settlement in 1900. The ﬁrst column is the base regression for POLS. Column 2 and 3 report results with
diﬀerent data speciﬁcations. The Column 2 includes the full sample from year 1880-1913. Column 3 reports results for diﬀerent weights
values of trade. Trade data was diasgregated from the region level to the country level using arable land area as a weight instead of our
base one which is the population. Column 5 6 and 7 use diﬀerent instrumental variables. The results for the standard gravity variable are
also signiﬁcant and exert the correct sign for the various speciﬁcations. The bigger the size, the higher is the trade ofr all sectors and the
further is the country from France, the less likely they will trade with France. Being landlocked and in times of war would reduce trade.
Being part of a trade agreement, custom union or currency union with france would increase trade, but being part of trade agreement with
british or other empire would reduce it. Favorable climate would also increase trade. Colonial dummies seem to exert a negative impact on
trade. Those results indicate that that colonial status per se does not necessarily present a positive impact on French trade if settlement
and trade policies are not accounted for.
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Table 6: The channels of European Settlement
(a) The channels of Settlement
French British
Settlement Settlement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constraint on Executive 0.92** -2.12*** 0.06 -0.52
(0.438) (0.532) (0.052) (0.398)
Democracy 4.42*** 5.76*** -0.14*** 3.82***
(0.359) (0.398) (0.020) (0.454)
Common Language -5.22*** 3.70*** 4.01*** -2.24***
(0.920) (0.724) (0.334) (0.375)
Duration of colonization 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.004*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 2,068 2,134 2,068 2,068 2,068
R-squared 0.333 0.145 0.411 0.094 0.34
(b) Correlation Matrix
Constraint on Democracy Common Duration of
Executive Language Colonization
Constraint on Executive 1
Democracy 0.5801 1
Common language -0.1525 -0.2074 1
Duration of colonization 0.3551 0.2026 -0.2262 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: POLS: The eﬀects of channels of settlement on trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Agriculture Raw industrial
Institutional eﬀect in
French Colonies -0.46*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.08***
(0.084) (0.015) (0.014) (0.029) (0.015)
Institutions eﬀect in
British colonies 0.66*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.12***
(0.089) (0.016) (0.015) (0.030) (0.016)
Institutions eﬀect in
Previous colonies 0.41*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07** 0.09***
(0.088) (0.016) (0.015) (0.030) (0.016)
Institutions eﬀect in
Other colonies -1.36*** -0.21*** -0.32*** -0.37*** 0.08
(0.299) (0.045) (0.065) (0.056) (0.052)
Network eﬀect in
French Colonies 1.27*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.34*** 0.10***
(0.119) (0.018) (0.019) (0.032) (0.025)
Network eﬀect in
British colonies -0.72*** -0.23*** -0.31*** 0.03 0.02
(0.154) (0.024) (0.027) (0.042) (0.028)
Network eﬀect in
Previous colonies -0.88*** -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.32*** -0.01
(0.191) (0.029) (0.035) (0.053) (0.040)
Network eﬀect in
Other colonies -0.30** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.02
(0.129) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.025)
Residuals in French
Colonies -0.19*** -0.02** -0.00 -0.13*** -0.01
(0.045) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009)
French colonies -16.75*** -3.08*** -3.58*** -7.81*** -0.96
(2.804) (0.415) (0.548) (0.771) (0.609)
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 115.41*** 21.50*** 21.88*** 28.82*** 11.07***
(5.537) (0.881) (1.007) (1.543) (1.195)
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,916 2,064 2,058 2,020 2,058
R-Squared 0.745 0.707 0.701 0.615 0.631
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Note: The institutions eﬀects and network eﬀects represent the ﬁtted values of the European settlements explained
by either as shown in equation 5. The residual is the unexplained part of the settlements. The standard gravity
variables not reported in this table show that they are signiﬁcant and exert the correct sign.
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Table 8: IV: The Eﬀects of channels of settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Agriculture Raw industrial
Institutions eﬀect in
French colonies
-0.68*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.17*** -0.11***
(0.109) (0.020) (0.017) (0.039) (0.020)
Institutions eﬀect in
British colonies
0.96*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.117) (0.021) (0.020) (0.040) (0.021)
Institutions eﬀect in
Previous colonies
0.62*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.116) (0.021) (0.019) (0.041) (0.022)
Institutions eﬀect in
Other colonies
-2.62*** -0.42*** -0.62*** -0.65*** 0.09
(0.513) (0.075) (0.112) (0.093) (0.088)
Network eﬀect in
French colonies
1.35*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 0.13***
(0.109) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.023)
Network eﬀect in
British colonies
-0.62*** -0.22*** -0.31*** 0.11*** 0.02
(0.157) (0.025) (0.028) (0.042) (0.028)
Network eﬀect in
Previous colonies
-0.79*** -0.27*** -0.22*** -0.27*** -0.00
(0.215) (0.033) (0.042) (0.059) (0.047)
Network eﬀect in
Other colonies
-0.23* -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.07* 0.01
(0.126) (0.020) (0.021) (0.036) (0.025)
Residuals in French
Colonies
-0.17*** -0.01* 0.00 -0.13*** -0.01
(0.044) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009)
French Colonies -16.50*** -3.44*** -3.81*** -7.46*** -0.71
(3.246) (0.493) (0.663) (0.884) (0.717)
All Controls
Constant 114.69*** 21.69*** 21.94*** 28.77*** 10.61***
(5.672) (0.893) (1.053) (1.570) (1.234)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,916 2,064 2,058 2,020 2,058
R-squared 0.749 0.713 0.704 0.616 0.634
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Note: The institutions eﬀects and network eﬀects represent the ﬁtted values of the European settlements explained
by either as shown in equation 5. The residual is the unexplained part of the settlements. The standard gravity
variables not reported in this table show that they are signiﬁcant and exert the correct sign.
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Appendix
Table A.1: The European Settlement as constructed from Huillery
District Precolonial
Empire
Current
Country
Name
European
Settle-
ment
District Precolonial
Empire
Current
Country
Name
European
Settle-
ment
Porto-Novo Adjatche benin 39.8 Nara Kaarta mali 22.5
Borgou Borgu benin 39.8 Nioro Kaarta mali 22.5
Abomey Dahomey benin 39.8 Sikasso Kenedugu mali 22.5
Allada Dahomey benin 39.8 Bandiagara Macina mali 22.5
Ouidah Dahomey benin 39.8 Gourma Macina mali 22.5
Tenkodogo Tenkodogo burkina
faso
10.1 Mopti Macina mali 22.5
Ouagadougou Wagadugu burkina
faso
10.1 Macina Segu mali 22.5
Ouahigouya Yatenga burkina
faso
10.1 Segou Segu mali 22.5
Koudougou Wagadugu burkina
faso
10.1 Adrar Emirate of
Adrar
mauritania 9.4
Bobodioulasso Gwiriko burkina
faso
10.1 Brakna Emirate of
Brakna
mauritania 9.4
Kaya Wagadugu burkina
faso
10.1 Trarza Emirate of
Trarza
mauritania 9.4
Dori Liptako burkina
faso
10.1 Tagant Emirate of
Tagant
mauritania 9.4
Fada Liptako burkina
faso
10.1 Goure Kanem-
Bornu
niger 7.4
Kindia Fuuta
Jaalo
guinea 70 NGuigmi Kanem-
Bornu
niger 7.4
Koumbia Fuuta
Jaalo
guinea 70 Dosso Sokoto niger 7.4
Labe Fuuta
Jaalo
guinea 70 Konny Sokoto niger 7.4
Mamou Fuuta
Jaalo
guinea 70 Tessaoua Sokoto niger 7.4
Pita Fuuta
Jaalo
guinea 70 Zinder Sokoto niger 7.4
Matam Fuuta Toro guinea 70 Hautegambie Bundu senegal 179
Podor Fuuta Toro guinea 70 Baol Bawol senegal 179
Kankan Samori guinea 70 Thies Bawol senegal 179
Kissidougou Samori guinea 70 Louga Jolof senegal 179
Kouroussa Samori guinea 70 Tivaouane Kajoor senegal 179
Bondoukou Abron ivory coast 11.7 Sinesaloum Siin Salum senegal 179
Assinie Sanwi ivory coast 11.7 Dagana Waalo senegal 179
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Table A.2: The country disaggregation data
Regions as deﬁned in the Tableau du Commerce general de la France Countries
Segregated
Colonizer Year of Col-
onization
Year of in-
dependence
Europe
Possessions anglaises
de la mediterranee
Gibraltar GBR 1700 2012
Cyprus GBR 1878 1960
Malta GBR 1802 1964
Afrique
Egypte Egypt GBR 1882 1922
Etats Barbaresques
Regence De Tripoli Libya ITA 1910 1947
Tunisie Tunisia FRA 1881 1956
Maroc Morocco FRA 1912 1956
Cote occidentale (Du
maroc au cap de
bonne esperance)
Western Sahara ESP 1884 1965
Mauritania FRA 1895 1960
Guinea Bissau PRT 1800 1973
Guinea FRA 1890 1960
Liberia USA 1847
Ivory Coast FRA 1889 1960
Togo FRA 1918 1960
Benin FRA 1892 1960
Cameroon FRA 1918 1960
Equatorial
Guinea
ESP 1844 1968
Gabon FRA 1885 1960
Congo FRA 1903 1960
Dr Of Congo BEL 1885 1960
Namibia DEU 1884 1949
Angola PRT 1500 1975
Sao Tome And
Principe
PRT 1500 1975
Botswana GBR 1885 1966
Afrique
Possessions
Anglaises
Partie Occidentale
(Y Compris Le Gap
De Bonne Esperance
Sierra Leone GBR 1808 1961
Gambia GBR 1888 1965
Ghana GBR 1874 1957
South Africa GBR 1806 1910
Nigeria GBR 1800 1914
Partie Orientale (Y
Compris L'ile
Maurice)
Malawi GBR 1891 1964
Tanzania GBR 1918 1961
Kenya GBR 1888 1963
Uganda GBR 1894 1962
Somalia GBR 1884 1960
Sudan GBR 1899 1960
Mauritius GBR 1835 1968
Zimbabwe GBR 1888 1965
Zambia GBR 1899 1964
Afrique
Autres Pays (Y
Compris L'ile De
Madagascar)
Mali FRA 1892 1960
Niger FRA 1922 1960
Chad FRA 1900 1960
Burkina Fasso FRA 1897 1960
Ethiopia
Mozambique PRT 1500 1975
Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Central African
Republic
FRA 1889 1960
Asie et Oceanie Indes Comptoirs
Anglais
India GBR 1857 1947
Myanmar GBR 1857 1948
Pakistan GBR 1857 1947
Bangladesh GBR 1857 1971
Hollandais (Java Et
Sumatra)
Indonesia PRT 1600 1945
Asie et Oceanie
Philippines Philippines ESP 1521 1898
Chine China
Royaume De Siam Thailand
Japon Japan
Australie Australia GBR 1750 1901
Autres Iles De
L'oceanie
Fiji GBR 1700 1970
Solomon Islands GBR 1893 1978
New Zealand GBR 1840 1907
Amerique Septentrionale
Etats Unis
Ocean Atlantique United States GBR 1600 1776
Ocean Paciﬁque
Mexique Mexico ESP 1650 1810
Amerique Centrale
Guatemala-
CostaRica-Honduras
Guatemala ESP 1519 1821
Costa Rica ESP 1522 1821
Honduras ESP 1520 1821
Nouvelle Grenade Colombia ESP 1525 1808
Amerique Meridionale
cote est
Venezuella Venezuela ESP 1490 1821
Brezil Brazil PRT 1500 1822
Uruguay
(MonteVideo)
Uruguay ESP 1500 1821
Republique
Argentine
Argentina ESP 1500 1816
cote ouest
Equateur Ecuador ESP 1500 1822
Perou Peru ESP 1500 1821
Bolivie Bolivia ESP 1500 1825
Chili Chile ESP 1500 1810
Amerique Antilles et possessions Europeennes
colonies anglaises Canada Canada GBR 1763 1867
Autres Y Compris
Les Antilles
Barbados GBR 1650 1966
Bahamas GBR 1650 1973
Jamaica GBR 1650 1962
Guyana GBR 1700 1966
British Virgin
Islands
GBR 1672 1967
Dominica GBR 1805 1978
Grenada GBR 1763 1974
Saint Lucia GBR 1750 1979
Trinidad And
Tobago
GBR 1750 1962
Antigua Et
Barbuda
GBR 1632 1981
Haiti Et Republique
Dominicaine
Haiti FRA 1697 1804
Dominican
Republic
ESP 1500 1865
Colonies espagnoles
Cuba-Porto Ricco
Cuba ESP 1492 1898
Puerto Rico ESP 1493 1898
Saint Thomas Virgin Islands
(Us)
DNK 1600 1917
Colonies
Hollandaises
Aruba PRT 1600 1986
Suriname PRT 1683 1975
Colonies Francaises
Algerie Algeria FRA 1830 1962
Tunisie Tunisia FRA 1881 1956
Maroc Morocco FRA 1912 1956
Congo Congo FRA 1903 1960
Senegal Senegal FRA 1850 1960
Etablissement
Francais De La Cote
Occidental D'afrique
Guinea FRA 1890 1960
Colonies Francaises
Central African
Republic
FRA 1889 1960
Gabon FRA 1885 1960
Ivory Coast FRA 1889 1960
Benin FRA 1892 1960
Mali FRA 1892 1960
Mauritania FRA 1895 1960
Burkina Fasso FRA 1897 1960
Chad FRA 1900 1960
Togo FRA 1918 1960
Cameroon FRA 1918 1960
Colonies Francaises
Madagascar Et
Dependences
Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Mayotte Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Noisy-Be Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Ile De La Reunion Reunion FRA 1642 2012
Cote Des Somalis Djibouti FRA 1896 1977
Etablissement
Francaise De L'inde
Laos FRA 1880 1949
Cambodia FRA 1863 1953
Indo-chine Francaise Vietnam FRA 1859 1945
Etablissements
Francais de l'
oceanie
Nouvelle Caledonie New Caledonia FRA 1853 2012
Autres
Etablissements
French Polynesia FRA 1842 2012
New Hebrides
(Vanuatu)
FRA 1880 1980
Guyane Francaise French Guiana FRA 1814 2012
Martinique Martinique FRA 1685 2012
Guadeloupe Guadeloupe FRA 1635 2012
Saint Pierre Et
Miquelon Et Grande
Peche
Saint Pierre Et
Miquelon
FRA 1814 2012
